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INTRODUCTION 
How many people complain about the cost of medication in the 
United States?  How much of a strain does payment for the 
treatment of a deadly disease put on the average American?  Most 
people dealing with this situation in America would answer that 
ensuring funds are available to continue treatment puts a huge 
amount of stress on an individual or a family—so much stress that, 
at times, an individual or a family may be forced to file for 
bankruptcy.  Now imagine this person or family lived in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  How much of a strain does this payment cost 
them?  Unfortunately, most Africans in Sub-Saharan countries 
affected with a disease never even get to that point.  The strain they 
deal with is the strain of wondering daily if they will ever have 
access to treatment.  High prices, clinics or hospitals located out of 
reach, insufficient government infrastructure, and lack of properly 
trained medical practitioners are just some of the reasons why 
affected individuals in countries like those in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have access problems, with high prices being blamed as one of the 
main reasons for lack of access.1 
 
 1 See Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment 
Help?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 107, 107–08 (2008); see also COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH: 
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 202 (2006), available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf. 
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But there are two sides to every story.  To understand why high 
prices are sought, you must put yourself in the shoes of an 
American pharmaceutical company competing with other drug 
companies for a profit and having to expend millions of dollars on 
testing to gain approval from the Food and Drug Administration 
(the “FDA”) before being able to market a drug.2  As a drug 
company, you also know that your main profits are derived from 
sales of drugs that are still covered by a patent.3  Once a drug goes 
off patent, generic companies enter the market and erode your 
profit margin.4 
The United States affords a high level of protection to 
intellectual property holders, including pharmaceutical companies 
owning patent rights.5  By giving the patent owners this protection, 
pharmaceutical companies are able to obtain the profits necessary 
to cover their research initiatives and foster innovation.6  If these 
companies were not afforded this high level of protection, there 
would be no incentive to expend the millions of dollars it costs to 
push a drug through the stages of testing necessary to gain FDA 
marketing approval.7  The United States is also active in pursuing 
infringers to ensure that the benefits of the statutorily-granted 
protection are not eroded.8 
Other countries do not offer such generous protection to begin 
with or do not offer intellectual property holders the means to 
effectively police infringing activity, even if the right is 
 
 2 See Dutfield, supra note 1, at 117. 
 3 See Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 
15, 2004), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17244. 
 4 See id.; Dutfield, supra note 1, at 117. 
 5 See Christopher Lea Lockwood, Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of 
Columbia: A Preemptive Strike Against State Price Restrictions on Prescription 
Pharmaceuticals, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 143, 148–49 (2009). 
 6 See id.  
 7 See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on 
Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 
285 (2008); see also Lockwood, supra note 5, at 148 (discussing the patent protection 
necessary in light of the four principle stages of research required to enter a drug on the 
market: “1) discovery of new compounds, 2) preclinical testing in laboratories . . . , 3) 
clinical trials, and 4) FDA review”). 
 8 See Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Countries: 
U.S. Efforts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 569, 569–70, 582 (1994). 
C06_MELLINO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2010  12:56 PM 
1352 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1349  
recognized.9  This can be a problem for intellectual property 
holders in countries like the United States.  The incentive for an 
American company to enter its goods into a market affording little 
intellectual property protection is very low.  Incentive to enter or 
keep a product in a market is also low where intellectual property 
protection, if granted, is not adequately enforced.  In markets 
where intellectual property rights are not adequately enforced, 
patent owners experience profit erosion due to the presence of 
infringing products on the market.10 
 In an effort to solve the problem of varying levels of 
intellectual property protection across country borders, members of 
the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”)11 adopted the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS” or the “TRIPS Agreement”).12  The purpose of 
the TRIPS Agreement is to enable “the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights” across country borders so as to 
promote “technological innovation and . . . the transfer and 
dissemination of technology.”13 
However, TRIPS presented a problem to the least developed 
countries (“LDC”s), such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, because 
these countries do not have the infrastructure in place to provide 
adequate patent protection, nor do they have capabilities to 
properly enforce patent rights, if and when they are granted within 
 
 9 See Baris Karapinar & Michelangelo Temmerman, Benefiting from Biotechnology: 
Pro-Poor Intellectual Property Rights and Public-Private Partnerships, 27 BIOTECH. L. 
REP. 189, 198 (2008). 
 10 See Kirchanski, supra note 8, at 571–72. 
 11 WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).  The WTO “is 
the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between 
nations.” What Is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).  The WTO consists of a 
group of 153 countries, wherein the countries are referred to as “member” countries. Id.  
Some of its functions include: “administering WTO trade agreements, [serving as a] 
forum for trade negotiations, handling national trade disputes, monitoring national trade 
policies, [providing] technical assistance and training for developing countries, and 
cooperati[ng] with other international organizations.” Id.  
 12 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 
4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 13 Id. at art. 7. 
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their countries.14  Perhaps a bigger problem and one that is heard 
frequently among critics and protesting countries is that the higher 
level of protection that member countries must provide to patent 
holders under TRIPS has the potential to maintain drug prices at 
high levels.  As a result, citizens of Sub-Saharan countries suffer 
because they do not have the income to pay for the price demanded 
for patented protection.  Thus, there is inevitable tension between 
the need for a company to obtain profits from its patented 
invention and a current need to alleviate the public health problems 
in LDCs by providing drugs at low or no cost.15  In the area of 
pharmaceuticals, this is especially problematic when looking at the 
treatments available for HIV/AIDS and other epidemics.  For 
instance, as of the end of 2008, 67% of the world’s HIV population 
resided in Sub-Saharan Africa.16 
However, despite TRIPS’ intended proliferation of stronger 
intellectual property protection across all member countries, which 
allows patent owners to reap greater economic benefits from their 
patents, it does not preclude access to life-saving treatment for 
poor LDCs unable to obtain patented life-saving treatments at the 
typical commercial rates.17  It left open the possibility of 
compulsory licenses and parallel importation for use by developing 
and least developed countries to obtain needed pharmaceuticals.18   
But criticism of the TRIPS Agreement led to the adoption of 
the Doha Declaration (“Doha”).19  Doha’s purpose was two-fold: 
to stress that TRIPS accounts for the developing and least 
developed countries’ public health problems, and to further clarify 
the provisions that countries can use to foster transfer of 
 
 14 See infra Part II.A.  
 15 Bird & Cahoy, supra note 7, at 283. 
 16 Worldwide AIDS & HIV Statistics, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/worldstats.htm 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2010). 
 17 Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents Obligations and Exceptions, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm# 
importing  (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter WTO Obligations]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) 
[hereinafter Doha Declaration]; see also Hoachen Sun, The Road to Doha and Beyond: 
Some Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 123, 
125 (2004). 
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intellectual property and essential pharmaceutical products 
necessary to treat those afflicted with epidemic diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS.20 
Unfortunately, despite the language of TRIPS/Doha and 
recognition of the public health problem by member countries,21 
access to much needed pharmaceuticals is still difficult for poorer 
nations to obtain and little has been done by the member countries 
through TRIPS to increase access.  For example, since a 2003 
decision by the TRIPS Council allowing non-producing LDCs to 
import pharmaceuticals, only one country has seen its benefits—
Canada has used the system to provide drugs to Rwanda.22 
The current state of affairs cannot be maintained if we are to 
further public health initiatives related to the LDCs.  This Note 
analyzes the options currently available through TRIPS for transfer 
of pharmaceutical technology to LDCs, how effective these 
options are, and what should be done in the long term to help ease 
the public health problems worldwide.  Part I will provide 
background on the TRIPS Agreement and its relevant declaration 
and decisions relating to public health.  Parts II and III will analyze 
the conflict that exists between the uniform intellectual property 
rights that TRIPS promotes and the LDCs’ lack of access to life-
saving treatments, despite the public health provisions.  Part IV 
will argue first that current TRIPS public health measures are not 
sufficient to solve the problem of access to essential 
pharmaceuticals in the long term because the conflict mentioned 
above will always remain.  Second, it will argue that mechanisms 
like public-private entities should be utilized to solve the problem 
instead. 
 
 20 See id. ¶¶ 1–5. 
 21 The TRIPS Agreement applies to all WTO members. Overview: The TRIPS 
Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2 
_e.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) [hereinafter WTO Overview]. 
 22 Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Address at the 11th Annual 
International Generic Pharmaceutical Alliance Conference in Geneva (Dec. 9, 2008), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl111_e.htm. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. TRIPS Agreement 
Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Agreement, otherwise known as the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, was 
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994.23  The TRIPS 
Agreement came about in order to foster the free movement of 
technology and innovation between member countries by 
attempting to circumscribe a uniform set of intellectual property 
rights that are protected and enforced across member countries.24  
While this was beneficial for protection of intellectual property 
rights, especially in developed countries, it was problematic for 
LDCs because recognition of intellectual property rights allows the 
rights holder to assert its patent and obtain monopoly pricing.25 
Within this broad agreement, provisions exist to specifically 
address the effect of intellectual property rights on public health.26  
Under Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, members are able to 
“adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, 
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development, provided that 
such measures are consistent with the provisions of th[e] 
Agreement.”27  In other words, it recognizes that public health 
problems, among others, may exist and allows members to adopt 
special measures to deal with these problems, as long as the 
measures are limited to those allowed by the TRIPS Agreement.28  
Examples of these measures, to be discussed in further detail 
below, include an explicit allowance for compulsory licenses and 
 
 23 TRIPS, supra note 12. 
 24 Id. at art. 7. 
 25 See, e.g., Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, The 
Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty 
Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144, 150–51 (2008) (discussing the issue of 
monopoly pricing for over-protective patents); Barton E. Showalter & Jeffery D. Baxter, 
Strategic Use of Software Patents, 547 PLI/Pat 1057, 1074–75 (1999) (discussing 
monopoly pricing as an after-effect of software patents). 
 26 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 8. 
 27 Id.   
 28 See id.  
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an implicit allowance of parallel importation through a failure to 
proscribe the activity, as established in the Doha Declaration.29 
In reference to patents, such as those on pharmaceutical 
products and processes, TRIPS entitles a patent owner to have its 
exclusive rights of production, use, sale, and importation protected 
when dealing with another member country.30  Members can 
provide exceptions to these exclusive rights if they “do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner.”31  These exceptions can take the form of special measures 
that are aimed at dealing with public health problems such as the 
lack of access to pharmaceuticals.32 
The first measure is a compulsory license.33  The traditional 
definition of a compulsory license is a government’s granting of a 
license without the permission of the rights holder.34  Generally, 
before a compulsory license can be granted under the TRIPS 
Agreement, the requesting party must first attempt to obtain a 
voluntary license from the patent owner on reasonable commercial 
terms.35  However, the term “reasonable commercial terms” is not 
defined by the TRIPS Agreement.  If a voluntary license cannot be 
obtained, then a compulsory license can then be issued.36  But, in 
“the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use,” a 
compulsory license can be issued without first negotiating for a 
voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms.37  The purpose 
 
 29 See Doha Declaration, supra note 20, ¶¶ 5–6.  
 30 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 28. 
 31 Id. at art. 30. 
 32 See Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 5. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Forcing Firms to Share the 
Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust (May 10, 
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.htm#N_29_. 
 35 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 31(b); see also TRIPS and Public Health: Frequently 
Asked Questions, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
TRIPs_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter TRIPS FAQ]. 
 36 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 31. 
 37 Id. at art. 31(b). 
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of the exception to the negotiation requirement is to save time,38 
although the TRIPS Agreement does not specify what would 
qualify as a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme 
urgency. 
Due to lack of resources, LDCs such as those in Africa would 
be unable to offer commercially reasonable terms to a patent owner 
of pharmaceutical products or processes.  To bypass the 
requirement to negotiate for a voluntary license on these terms, the 
government of an LDC would have to assert a national emergency 
or other circumstance of extreme urgency when requesting a 
compulsory license.39  The license would then enable the LDC to 
utilize the patented formula or technology.  But, even if the 
exception is invoked, TRIPS still requires that “the right[s] holder 
shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each 
case, taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization.”40  TRIPS does not clarify what would constitute 
“adequate remuneration.”41  This will be considered in more detail 
later in Part I.C. 
The TRIPS Agreement also leaves the notion of parallel 
importation on the table.42  It does not explicitly allow for parallel 
importation, yet it does not explicitly prohibit it either.43  Under 
parallel importation, goods are sold into the parallel market at a 
much cheaper price than they could have been sold through the 
patent owner.44  While this is beneficial for the party that seeks to 
 
 38 TRIPS FAQ, supra note 35. 
 39 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 31(b). 
 40 Id. at art. 31(h). 
 41 JAMES LOVE, WORLD HEALTH ORG., REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-
VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2005), http://www.who.int/ 
medicines/areas/technical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf. 
 42 Parallel importation occurs when goods are produced by the patent owner or with 
the patent owner’s permission, through a license, and then subsequently imported into 
another country without permission of the patent owner. International Exhaustion and 
Parallel Importation, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_ 
business/export/international_exhaustion.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 
WIPO Parallel Importation]. 
 43 See The TRIPs Agreement and Pharmaceuticals: Parallel Import, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh1459e/6.4.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2010). 
 44 See, e.g., Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 248–49 (D.C. Cir. 
1992).  
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purchase goods on the parallel market, it is disconcerting to the 
patent owner because the patent owner would lose profits that it 
could have earned had it been the seller.  But this type of 
importation is based on the doctrine of patent exhaustion, wherein 
the rights afforded by a patent on a batch of products are exhausted 
once a party has initially sold that batch.45  Thus, under the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion, the patent owner has no rights in a 
product once the product has been sold to the first party, regardless 
of whether or not the first party resells the good.46  An LDC cannot 
afford to pay retail, so parallel importation is one method by which 
it can gain access to life-saving treatments at much lower prices. 
Despite the two available options aimed at improving public 
health access for LDCs—compulsory licenses and parallel 
importation—there was little movement on the part of the 
developing countries to use them.47  Complaints arose that 
developed countries were acting contrary to the furtherance of 
public health by setting forth intellectual property requirements, 
such as the recognition and enforcement of patent protection for 
epidemic-treating pharmaceuticals, that could not be met by 
LDCs.48 
Another problem with TRIPS that became apparent was that a 
compulsory license would only be beneficial if the licensee 
country had the infrastructure and capability to make use of the 
formula or technology because a license only gives authority to use 
the formula in the patent.49  Thus, a country that lacks the facilities 
to manufacture the formula or technology will be unable to make 
use of the compulsory license.  Certain developing countries such 
as Brazil do have manufacturing capabilities, but many LDCs such 
as those in Sub-Saharan Africa do not.  Therefore, a compulsory 
license, as allowed under article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
would be of little or no use to those countries.  The Doha 
 
 45 WIPO Parallel Importation, supra note 42; see Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., 
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115–17 (2008). 
 46 See id.  
 47 See Jerome H. Reichman, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of Patented 
Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 248 
(2009).  
 48 See id.  
 49 Id.   
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Declaration was adopted, in part, to deal with this issue and to 
highlight the importance of the implementation and interpretation 
of the TRIPS Agreement provisions aimed at public health.50 
B. The Doha Declaration 
The fourth Ministerial Declaration51 was adopted at the Fourth 
Session of the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Conference 
in Doha, Qatar in November of 2001, and it includes the public 
health-specific Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (the “Doha Declaration”).52  This declaration was meant to 
stress the importance of using TRIPS to further public health by 
“promoting both access to existing medicines and research and 
development into new medicines.”53  It sought to accomplish this 
by clarifying the options available to member countries.54 
The Public Health Declaration states that “each member has 
the right to grant compulsory licen[s]es and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licen[s]es are granted.”55  
It allows for each member to determine, for the purposes of issuing 
a compulsory license, “what constitutes a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency.”56  It specifically referred 
to emergencies relating to HIV/AIDS and other epidemic 
diseases.57 
But under the language of the TRIPS Agreement, a compulsory 
license could only be granted for use in the domestic market of the 
requestor.58  This has two important implications: one, a country 
lacking sufficient manufacturing capacity cannot make use of it, 
and two, a country that was issued a compulsory license could only 
 
 50 Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 6. 
 51 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration]. 
 52 Doha Declaration, supra note 19. 
 53 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 51, ¶ 17.  
 54 See Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 5. 
 55 Id. ¶ 5(b). 
 56 Id. ¶ 5(c).  
 57 “Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, 
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can 
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id. 
 58 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 31(f). 
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produce the licensed technology for its domestic use and could not 
export the product to other countries that lacked manufacturing 
capabilities.59  Doha “recognize[d] that WTO members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical 
sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”60  Although 
the Public Health Declaration did not resolve the issue, it called on 
the Council for TRIPS to address the problem and find a solution 
by the end of 2002.61 
The Public Health Declaration also touches upon parallel 
importation by interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to allow for each 
member to establish how it would proscribe the activity.62  Again, 
parallel importation allows for an LDC to buy the good for a lower 
price than if it obtained the good straight from the patent owner.63  
An example would be Brazil obtaining a license from an American 
company to manufacture and sell an HIV/AIDS drug domestically, 
and then selling the product to Africa without permission from the 
American company. 
Taking into account the difficulties of establishing a system by 
which 1) intellectual property rights will be protected, and 2) 
violations of those rights will be enforced in an LDC, the Public 
Health Declaration also stresses that TRIPS give LDC members 
until January 1, 2016 to comply with certain sections of the TRIPS 
Agreement.64  This deadline is an exception to the one-year 
deadline for developed countries and the 2005 deadline for 
developing member countries.65  The Public Health Declaration 
also recognizes the “right of least developed country members to 
 
 59 See id. at art. 31(e).  
 60 Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 6. 
 61 Id.  
 62 See id. ¶ 5(d). 
 63 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 64 Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 7 (“We also agree that the least developed 
country members will not be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, to 
implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement or to enforce 
rights provided for under these Sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the 
right of least developed country members to seek other extensions of the transition 
periods as provided for in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.”). 
 65 TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 65. 
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seek other extensions of the transition periods.”66  The Declaration 
specifically states that this exception applies “with respect to 
pharmaceutical products.”67  Since the intellectual property 
regimes of LDCs are not as developed, it is likely that they will 
seek additional extensions in order to implement the TRIPS 
Agreement’s requirements.  But extending the deadline for 
compliance without further specifying how to comply or assisting 
with compliance will not help member countries become 
compliant, especially if they can keep seeking extensions of the 
transition periods.68 
C. August 30, 2003, TRIPS Council Decision 
In addition to the further clarification and direction provided by 
Doha, issues that arise from the administration of the TRIPS 
Agreement are addressed through decisions delivered by the 
Council for TRIPS.69  The most important decision related to 
public health is the August 30, 2003 Decision (the “2003 
Decision”).70  This decision purported to solve the issue of 
compulsory licensing in the case of member countries lacking 
production capabilities.71 
The 2003 Decision specifically took into account the 
instruction of the Doha Declaration to find a solution to the 
problem of the difficulties that “WTO members with insufficient 
or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could 
face in making effective use of compulsory licenses.”72  A 
compulsory license, with nothing more, does not provide much 
help to a country that does not have the manufacturing ability to 
make use of the license.  As such, the 2003 Decision sets forth the 
 
 66 Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 7. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See TRIPS, supra note 12, at art. 66(1). 
 69 TRIPS Council, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_ 
E/trips_e/intel6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).  The Council for TRIPS is the body 
responsible for administering TRIPS. Id. 
 70 Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 Decision].   
 71 Id.   
 72 Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 6. 
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framework for a system (otherwise known as the Paragraph 6 
System) in which the affected LDC can obtain needed 
pharmaceutical products through a compulsory license that allows 
for importation from another member country with sufficient 
manufacturing capabilities.73  “Within that framework, each WTO 
member decides for itself how it will implement the decision 
domestically” through its legislation.74 
LDCs are identified as “eligible importing [m]ember[s]” under 
the decision,75 and other member countries can be eligible to 
become importing members as long as they meet certain 
guidelines.76  An eligible importing member may use the system 
“in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency or . . . [for] public non-commercial use.”77  This 
is consistent with the compulsory license language in both TRIPS 
and the Doha Declaration.78   
The 2003 Decision also sets out requirements that must be met 
in order for countries to participate in the Paragraph 6 System.79  
Requirements for importing countries, such as LDCs, to import 
pharmaceutical products include, but are not limited to, 
specification of “the names and expected quantities of the product 
needed” to the Council for TRIPS, and granting a compulsory 
license if that pharmaceutical product is patented in the LDC’s 
territory.80 
 
 73 See 2003 Decision, supra note 70, ¶ 6. 
 74 Features of the Regime, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, http://www.camr-
rcam.gc.ca/intro/regime_e.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). 
 75 2003 Decision, supra note 70, ¶ 1(b). 
 76 Id.  
 77 Id.  
 78 See supra notes 33–37, 55–57 and accompanying text.  
 79 See 2003 Decision, supra note 70, ¶ 2(a).  
 80 Id. (according to paragraph 2(a) of the 2003 Decision, importing countries must: “(i) 
specif[y] the names and expected quantities of the product(s) needed; (ii) confirm[] that 
the eligible importing [m]ember in question, other than a least developed country 
[m]ember, has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question in one of the ways set out in the 
Annex to this Decision; and (iii) confirm[] that, where a pharmaceutical product is 
patented in its territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory license in 
accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of this 
Decision”).   
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The exporting member countries also must meet certain 
requirements.81  They can only manufacture the amount necessary 
to meet the needs of the importing member, whose needs were 
already specified to the Council for TRIPS,82 and the entire amount 
of that production must then be exported to the requesting 
importing member.83  The products must be specifically identified 
as being produced under the system laid out in the 2003 
Decision.84  Finally, prior to shipping, any exporting member must 
post on a website the quantities being supplied to the destination 
and the distinguishing features of the product.85 
In addition, the exporting member countries must provide 
adequate remuneration, “taking into account the economic value to 
the importing [m]ember,” whereas this requirement is waived for 
importing countries.86  As stated earlier, “adequate remuneration” 
is not detailed in TRIPS, the Doha Declaration, or the 2003 
Decision.87  In fact adequate remuneration varies widely from 
country to country.88  In Remuneration Guidelines for Non-
Voluntary Use of a Patent on Medical Technologies, James Love 
points out that countries should focus on two issues when setting 
forth their own guidelines for remuneration, one of which is to 
ensure that the royalty is not so high that it presents “a barrier for 
 
 81 Id. ¶ 2(b) (“[T]he compulsory licen[s]e issued by the exporting [m]ember under this 
Decision shall contain the following conditions: (i) only the amount necessary to meet the 
needs of the eligible importing [m]ember(s) may be manufactured under the licen[s]e and 
the entirety of this production shall be exported to the [m]ember(s) which has notified its 
needs to the Council for TRIPS; (ii) products produced under the licen[s]e shall be clearly 
identified as being produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific 
label[]ing or marking.  Suppliers should distinguish such products through special 
packaging and/or special colo[]ring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that 
such distinction is feasible and does not have a significant impact on price; and (iii) 
before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website [certain] information.”). 
 82 Id. ¶ 2(b)(i). 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. ¶ 2(b)(ii). 
 85 Id. ¶ 2(b)(iii). 
 86 Id. ¶ 3. 
 87 See generally TRIPS, supra note 12; Ministerial Declaration, supra note 51; Doha 
Declaration, supra note 19; 2003 Decision, supra note 70. 
 88 LOVE, supra note 41, at 5. 
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access to medicines.”89  This is especially true when a compulsory 
license is issued for the very purpose of improved access to 
medicines at lower prices.90  Typically, in a situation where a 
compulsory license is issued for public health reasons in low-
income countries, the remuneration has been between 0 and 6% of 
the generic price.91   
Though compulsory license remuneration in public health 
situations is typically low, the TRIPS provision nonetheless allows 
for substantial discretion.92  It is likely that TRIPS left this 
provision somewhat arbitrary in order to pacify all member 
countries, especially developed member countries in which patent 
protection is significantly more important in helping patent holders 
obtain profits.  In fact, patent holders that do not agree with the 
level of remuneration that the country offers can bring a complaint 
before the TRIPS Council.93  So, although guidelines have been 
published, it is unlikely that a consensus will be reached on the 
prevailing standard for adequate remuneration any time soon. 
The 2003 Decision also opened another avenue to bring much 
needed pharmaceutical products to developing or least developed 
countries—an importing member that has produced or imported a 
pharmaceutical product may export the product to another 
developed or developing country that is a party to the same 
regional trade agreement and shares the same health problem.94  It 
states that “[i]t is understood that this will not prejudice the 
territorial nature of the patent rights in question.”95  In effect, the 
2003 Decision is condoning parallel importation to the extent that 
similarly suffering developing or least developed countries can 
 
 89 Id. (noting two paramount issues: 1) “the system of setting royalties should not be 
overly complex or difficult to administer, given the capacity of the government managing 
the system,” and 2) “the amount of the royalty should not present a barrier for access to 
medicines”).  
 90 Id.  
 91 See id. at 7–9. 
 92 Id. at 5.  
93    See Gustav Ando, World’s First Compulsory License Issued in Malaysia for Generic 
HIV/AIDS Drug, WORLD MARKET ANALYSIS, Feb. 24, 2004. 
 94 2003 Decision, supra note 70, ¶ 6(i). 
 95 Id. ¶ 6(i). 
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export pharmaceutical products to each other if they are in need of 
treatment for the same health problems. 
After the 2003 Decision, many countries announced that they 
would not use the Paragraph 6 System to import, even if they meet 
the specific requirements and guidelines.96  These member 
countries consist mainly of the United States, Canada, European 
countries, Australia, and New Zealand.97  Another group of 
member countries specified that it would only use the system to 
import in national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.98  This group includes member countries such as China, 
Israel, Mexico, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates.99 
The provisions of the 2003 Decision were formally accepted as 
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement on December 6, 2005, and 
will be formally built into TRIPS when two-thirds of the WTO’s 
members have ratified the change.100  But, despite the fact that this 
option is now on the table, it has seen very little use.  Even as 
recently as December of 2008, the Director-General of the WTO, 
Pascal Lamy, admitted that criticism of the cumbersome and 
complex nature of the system has possibly stymied any or most 
positive effects.101  A more detailed analysis will be provided in 
Parts III and IV. 
II. APPLICATION OF TRIPS, DOHA, AND THE DECISIONS 
While much focus has been placed on ensuring that a 
framework exists for the furtherance of public health, as mentioned 
above, member countries have been slow to implement the 
procedures laid out in TRIPS, the Doha Declaration, and the 
decisions that followed.102  Various reasons, such as the 
 
 96 WTO Obligations, supra note 17.  
 97 Id. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id.  
 100 Decision of General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 
6, 2005); see also Press Release, World Trade Org., Members OK Amendment to Make 
Health Flexibility Permanent (Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm. 
 101 Lamy, supra note 22. 
 102 See infra Part III. 
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complexity of a country’s legislation relating to the provisions, fear 
of trade retaliation, interference with basic intellectual property 
rights, and lack of technology suited for LDCs, continue to stymie 
the progress on providing access to essential pharmaceuticals.103 
While placing measures to further public health in written 
agreements is certainly one step towards that goal, countries must 
move beyond mere verbal and written support and actually begin 
to implement these principles.  Additionally, many of the most 
visible global organizations are also dedicated to finding solutions 
for these public health problems,104 but again, they have produced 
very little more than verbal and written support.  The following are 
examples of how the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement are being 
treated or applied throughout the world. 
A. World Organizations 
The United Nations (the “U.N.”) is a prominent global 
organization “committed to maintaining international peace and 
security, developing friendly relations among nations and 
promoting social progress, better living standards and human 
rights.”105  In fact, the U.N. established UNAIDS106—a program 
specifically dedicated to the “global commitment to scale up 
access to HIV treatment, prevention, care and support.”107  In a 
2006 declaration, twelve years after TRIPS was signed and five 
years after Doha, the U.N. went so far as to “[r]eaffirm that the 
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures now and in the future to protect 
public health.”108  Members also “[r]esolve[d] to assist developing 
 
 103 See infra Part III. 
 104 See, e.g., Health, The International Response, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/ 
health/index_response.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2010); see also infra Part II.A. 
 105 UN at a Glance, UN, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 
2010). 
 106 UNAIDS, http://unaids.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2010). 
 107 Universal Access to HIV Treatment, Prevention, Care and Support, UNAIDS, 
http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/UniversalAccess/default.asp (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2010). 
 108 G.A. Res 60/262, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/262 (June 15, 2006) [hereinafter G.A. 
Res 60/262]. 
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countries”109 and “[e]ncourage pharmaceutical companies, donors, 
multilateral organizations and other partners to develop public-
private partnerships in support of research and development and 
technology transfer.”110 
These statements are encouraging and show that the 
organization supports the public health initiatives of TRIPS.  But 
merely setting forth reaffirmations and resolutions in a declaration 
will not ensure implementation of the public health initiatives by 
participating countries.  These countries actually have to act on the 
points in these declarations through modification of certain 
legislation and regional and bilateral treaty agreements.  Mention 
was also made to private-public partnerships,111 the viability of 
which will be developed further in Part IV. 
The World Health Organization (the “WHO”) is another 
prominent global organization addressing public health 
problems.112  Its responsibilities include “providing leadership on 
global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting 
norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, 
providing technical support to countries and monitoring and 
assessing health trends.”113  It has also called for measures to 
increase the access to life-saving pharmaceuticals, such as 
removing intellectual property barriers to research and 
development for public health.114  WHO member countries 
participated in drafting a resolution outlining steps needed to 
improve public health, though barely referring to the provisions in 
TRIPS.115  But again, these steps are essentially broad measures 
only touching upon the surface.  To give life to these resolutions, 
countries will have to ensure that the legislation and treaty 
agreements allow for such measures. 
 
 109 Id. ¶ 44. 
 110 Id. ¶ 46.   
 111 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 112 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/en (last visited Mar. 3, 2010). 
 113 About WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/about/en (last visited Apr. 
5, 2010). 
 114 See World Health Assembly Resolution on Global Strategy and Plan of Action on 
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHA. Res. 61.21, ¶ 2, 61st World 
Health Assembly, 8th plen. mtg. WHO Doc. WHA61/2008/Rec.21 (May 24, 2008). 
 115 See generally id. at annex. 
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The real problem in implementing TRIPS-like provisions is 
that the TRIPS Agreement’s main purpose is to afford a system of 
uniform protection measures for intellectual property rights of all 
member countries.116  By signing TRIPS, developed countries 
looked to secure in other member countries the same or a similar 
level of rights that they afford their domestic intellectual property 
owners.117  Promoting public health measures was only a side 
issue, and therefore exceptions were carved out of TRIPS to 
facilitate this secondary purpose.118  In fact, the system set forth in 
the 2003 Decision is contrary to the main purpose of facilitating 
protection of intellectual property rights cross-border.119  This 
issue will be analyzed further in Part III. 
B. Member Country Reactions 
A prime example of the juxtaposition between developed 
countries’ push for greater intellectual property protection across 
borders, and the detrimental effect that increased protection has on 
the LDCs’ ability to obtain pharmaceuticals at affordable prices, is 
the lawsuit brought by thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies, 
including the United States and European companies, to block 
legislation passed by the South African government in 1997.120  
The legislation aimed to allow for the parallel importation of 
drugs, generic replacement of brand-named drugs, and price 
controls.121  The pharmaceutical companies argued that the 
legislation was counter to South Africa’s commitment to TRIPS, 
specifically, to promote recognition and protection of the 
companies’ patents.  South Africa, on the other hand, argued that 
its actions were in line with TRIPS.122 
 
 116 See TRIPS, supra note 12, at pmbl. 
 117 See WTO Overview, supra note 21. 
 118 See id.  
 119 See infra Part III. 
 120 Int’l Activity Report, South Africa: Big Pharma Backs Down, DOCTORS WITHOUT 
BORDERS (2001), http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/report.cfm?id=1204 
[hereinafter Big Pharma Backs Down]; see also Anthony Stoppard, Health—South 
Africa: Drug Companies Drop Lawsuit Against Government, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Apr. 
19, 2001), http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2001/IP010413.html. 
 121 Big Pharma Backs Down, supra note 120. 
 122 Id. 
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During this time, the United States also placed South Africa on 
its Special 301 Report.123  As will be discussed in Part III, the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (the “USTR”) 
created the Special 301 Report to list and give notice to countries 
that it believes to have committed trade violations.124  Once they 
have been put on notice by the Special 301 Report, countries are 
subject to trade sanctions if actually found to be in violation of 
trade agreements.125 
But shortly after initiating the lawsuit, the pharmaceutical 
companies were met with much resistance from, amongst others, 
non-governmental organizations like Medecins Sans Frontiers.126  
Finally, in 2001, around the time when the Doha Declaration was 
highlighting the importance of facilitating access to pharmaceutical 
drugs for LDCs, the pharmaceutical companies dropped the 
lawsuit.127 
Despite the aforementioned treatment of South Africa, 
countries such as the United States are currently expressing their 
support of public health initiatives taken by LDCs.  But it is still 
questionable whether or not the support will move beyond mere 
express support to actionable support   In the April 2009 Special 
301 Report, the USTR acknowledged its support of public health 
measures, although using a supportive rather than a proactive 
tone.128  For instance, the United States “respects a country’s right 
to protect public health, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all and supports the vital role of the patent system in 
promoting the development and creation of new and innovative 
lifesaving drugs.”129  The United States also “respects” rights to 
grant compulsory licenses and notes the country’s acceptance of 
the 2005 Amendment, adopted by the TRIPS General Council, 
 
 123 Scott Lucyk, Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to Essential Medicines 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 38 OTTAWA L. REV. 191, 213 (2006). 
 124 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/Full%20Version%20of%20the%202009%20SPECIAL%20301%20REPORT.pdf.  
 125 See id. at 39.  
 126 See Big Pharma Backs Down, supra note 120. 
 127 Stoppard, supra note 120. 
 128 See 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 124, at 6. 
 129 Id. 
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promoting public health.130  Additionally, the USTR stated in its 
Special Report that “[t]he United States will work to ensure that 
the provision of our bilateral and regional trade agreements are 
consistent with these views, and do not impede the taking of 
measures necessary to protect public health.”131 
In order to give credence to the TRIPS provisions on public 
health and its statement above, the United States needs to be 
proactive and set forth provisions in its trade agreements and 
legislation that foster “access to medicine” for all.  Mere verbal 
and written support in a report is not enough.  In fact, critics are 
quick to point out that the United States has no problem issuing 
compulsory licenses for its own gain,132 yet discourages others 
from using them, especially in public health circumstances (as seen 
in the case of South Africa).133  Other countries that signed on to 
TRIPS must also move past mere support and become active in 
implementing health measures.  To date, only one country has 
taken the initiative to export pharmaceutical products through the 
Paragraph 6 System—Canada.134 
C. Utilization of Compulsory Licenses 
Prior to 2005, developing countries and LDCs could more 
easily obtain generic HIV/AIDS drugs from India through 
compulsory licenses that did not fall under the reach of TRIPS 
because India did not recognize patents on medicines and had 
expansive manufacturing capabilities.135  But in 2005, India 
implemented intellectual property protection for patents on 
medicines to comply with TRIPS; thus the use of such compulsory 
licenses dropped considerably.136  Because countries could no 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 The United States issued a compulsory license for the antibiotic Ciprofloxacin, from 
Bayer, during the Anthrax scare in 2001. See LOVE, supra note 41, at 28. 
 133 Dutfield, supra note 1, at 112. 
 134 Kanaga Raja, Members Discussed Implementation of TRIPS “Para 6” Solution, 
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/ 
2010/twninfo100212.htm. 
135  See Sangeeta Shashikant, More Countries Use Compulsory License, But New 
Problems Emerge, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (May 19, 2005), http://www.twnside.org.sg/ 
title2/health.info/twninfohealth004.htm. 
136  See id. 
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longer use compulsory licenses to obtain generic versions of 
patented pharmaceuticals from India, they were forced to follow 
the provisions for obtaining a compulsory license highlighted in 
the Doha Declaration.   
Initially, countries were slow to implement any of these 
provisions, but developing countries with manufacturing 
capabilities started to take advantage of them around 2006.137  In 
2006, Thailand issued a compulsory license for Efavirenz, an HIV 
drug manufactured by Merck & Co.,138 and in January of 2007, 
Thailand also issued a compulsory license on the antiretroviral 
HIV/AIDS drug, Kaletra, made by Abbott Laboratories.139  Then, 
in May of 2007, Brazil followed suit by issuing a compulsory 
license for Efavirenz after price negotiations broke down between 
the country and Merck.140  On a similar note, the Philippines 
introduced legislation that made it easier to issue compulsory 
licenses and allow for parallel importation.141  Again, compulsory 
licenses allow countries to provide needed treatment at a much 
lower cost than if they would have had to purchase directly from 
the patent owner.142  Although these countries are not as 
financially destitute as an LDC, they still do not possess the 
resources of a developed nation. 
While this relatively recent uptick in compulsory license 
activity is positive for countries with manufacturing capabilities, 
there are negatives, as discussed later in Part III.  The licenses are 
also useless for a country with no manufacturing capacities 
because a compulsory license, on its own, only requires that the 
patent owner allow the requesting party to make use of the formula 
or technology encompassed in the patent.143  Most LDCs would 
 
 137 Gail E. Evans, Strategic Patent Licensing for Public Research Organizations: 
Deploying Restriction and Reservation Clauses to Promote Medical R&D in Developing 
Countries, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 181–83 (2008). 
138  Examples of Health-Related Compulsory Licenses, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). 
 139 Evans, supra note 137, at 184 (noting that U.S.-based Abbott Laboratories owned 
the patent on the antiretroviral drug licensed by Thailand).   
 140 Id. 
 141 Id.  
 142 See Dutfield, supra note 1, at 120. 
 143 Doha Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 6. 
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need to utilize the Paragraph 6 system to obtain the needed 
medicines because they do not have manufacturing capabilities 
within their own countries.  But, to date, Rwanda is the only 
country without sufficient manufacturing capabilities to make 
sufficient use of a compulsory license and take advantage of the 
Paragraph 6 system.144 
D. Utilization of the Paragraph 6 System 
In 2004, Canada implemented a version of the Paragraph 6 
System by modifying its drug patent legislation with An Act to 
Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act—The Jean 
Chrétien Pledge to Africa (the “Jean Chrétien Act”).145  The Jean 
Chrétien Act set up the legal framework for what is known as 
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (“CAMR”).146  CAMR lays 
out the requirements that must be met for a country, such as an 
LDC, to import disease-treating drugs.147  It also lays out the 
requirements for companies willing to take part in the manufacture 
and export of the drugs to requesting countries.148  The goal of the 
CAMR is “to facilitate timely access to generic versions of 
patented drugs and medical devices, especially those needed by 
least developed or developing countries to fight HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases.”149  In September of 2007, 
 
 144 See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Rwanda Pioneers Use of WTO Patent Flexibility for 
HIV/AIDS Medicine, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 20, 2007), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2007/07/20/rwanda-pioneers-use-of-wto-patent-flexibility-for-hivaids-
medicine (noting that Rwanda was the first and only country to import patented medicine 
produced without authorization from patent holders because it was a country “with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 145 Background, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, http://www.camrrcam. 
gc.ca/intro/context_e.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Background, CAMR]. 
 146 Id.  
 147 Requirements for Importing Countries, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, 
http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/countr-pays/import/index_e.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) 
[hereinafter Requirements for Importing Countries, CAMR]. 
 148 Requirements for Companies, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, http://www.camr-
rcam.gc.ca/compan-entrepris/req-exig/index_e.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) 
[hereinafter Requirements for Companies, CAMR]. 
 149 Background, CAMR, supra note 145. 
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Canada utilized its version of the system to ship generic HIV/AIDS 
medicines to Rwanda.150 
The requirements of an importing country under CAMR are to 
identify a drug from the list of eligible products, notify the WTO 
of its need, and then find a suitable pharmaceutical company from 
which it can import the drug.151  The exporting party, the 
pharmaceutical company, is first required to enter into a sales 
agreement with the importing country for a specified quantity of a 
specific drug.152  The company is also required to submit an 
application to Canada’s Commissioner of Patents to obtain an 
authorization for export.153  Additional terms and conditions after 
authorization must be met, including certain anti-diversionary 
measures.154  The products to be exported must meet the same 
safety, efficacy, and quality requirements that drugs for national 
use are required to meet.155  In addition, the product manufactured 
for export must have special markings, coloring, and labeling that 
will distinguish it from the patented version that is sold on the 
national level.156 
In 2008, upon the authorization of GlaxoSmithKline and the 
Canadian subsidiaries of Shire and Boehringer Ingelheim, general 
drug maker Apotex manufactured a “fixed dose triple combination 
antiretroviral medicine” for export to Rwanda.157  Apotex has since 
sent out two total shipments of the AIDS drug to Rwanda.158  
Despite these successful shipments, no other developing country 
has tried to import drugs from Canada.159  Even Rwanda would 
 
 150 Nikki Bozinoff, A Pharm Reduction Approach, DOMINION (Apr. 9, 2010), 
http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/3288. 
 151 Requirements for Importing Countries, CAMR, supra note 147.   
 152 Requirements for Companies, CAMR, supra note 148. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Anti-Diversionary Measures—Companies, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, 
http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/compan-entrepris/req-exig/anti_e.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
2010). 
 157 Big Pharmaceutical Firms Agree to Generic Drugs for Rwanda, AFRICA GOOD 
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.africagoodnews.com/health/big-pharmaceutical-firms-
agree-to-generic-drugs-for-rwanda.html [hereinafter Generic Drugs for Rwanda]. 
 158 Id.  One shipment of the generic drug amounts to a one-year supply. Id. 
 159 See Raja, supra note 134. 
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have to restart the CAMR process if it wanted to reorder the same 
drug because of the provision in CAMR that limits the quantity of 
the license to the amount originally requested by the country.160 
III. ISSUES AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRIPS 
PROVISIONS 
A. Complexity of Legislation 
As alluded to in the section above, the Paragraph 6 System has 
been implemented only once with little or no indication of when it 
will be implemented again.161  The generic manufacturer Apotex 
and other critics have pointed out several issues with CAMR that 
may account for the failure of additional implementation. 
Apotex indicated that CAMR is too complicated a process and 
that other countries wishing to import drugs have not yet made any 
effort to “jump through the hoops imposed by CAMR.”162  In its 
criticism, it cites to such problems as the difficulty that LDCs have 
in identifying the proper process to obtain import permission.163  
Other critics have also found the legislation to be “overly complex 
and unusable.”164  They cite to the lack of input in the legislative 
process from the governments of the developing countries as one 
of the root problems.165  For instance, there are over nineteen 
sections and one hundred sub-clauses in the legislation to read 
 
 160 Jillian C. Cohen-Kohler, Laura C. Esmail & Andrea Perez Cosio, Canada’s 
Implementation of the Paragraph 6 Decision: Is It Sustainable Public Policy?, 
GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.global 
izationandhealth.com/content/pdf/1744-8603-3-12.pdf; see also Requirements for 
Importing Countries, CAMR, supra note 147. 
 161 See Raja, supra note 134. 
 162 Press Release, Apotex Inc., Second Shipment of Life-Saving Aids Drug Leaving for 
Africa (Sept. 18, 2009), available at http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/ 
20090918.asp. 
 163 Letter from John Hems, Dir., Can.’s Access to Meds. Regime, to Douglas Clark & 
Brigitte Zirger, Dirs., Apotex Inc. (Jan. 23, 2007) [hereinafter CAMR Letter], available 
at http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/review-reviser/camr_rcam_apotex_18-eng.pdf.  
 164 Cohen-Kohler, Esmail & Cosio, supra note 160. 
 165 Id. 
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through and interpret.166  This requires some level of legal training 
or support to analyze and implement.167  As such, significant 
resources must be spent on this analysis, but unfortunately, 
resources are limited in LDCs.168  The legislation also restricts the 
list of medicines available—if a drug is not on the list, it cannot be 
manufactured for export.169  This is a problem because LDCs are in 
need of many drugs that are not on the list.170  These examples of 
the complicated nature of the importation system are by no means 
exhaustive, as other criticisms have been launched. 
Other problems cited by Apotex affect the manufacturer.171  
Requirements such as trying to obtain a voluntary license prior to a 
compulsory license, or having to renew a compulsory license, are 
unnecessary, time consuming, and add to the cost of the process.172  
Unlike TRIPS, CAMR still requires a negotiation period with the 
patent owner before a country may apply for a compulsory 
license.173  The costs of the negotiations alone act as a deterrent to 
generic manufactures.174  In fact, Apotex itself threatened to 
abandon the project, citing that the process was too “costly and 
complicated.”175  On a positive note, the three drug companies 
initially authorizing Apotex to manufacture the “triple 
combination” medicine have just recently pledged their continued 
 
 166 MARILYN MCHARG, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES CAN., REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES REGIME: SUBMISSION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (2007), 
available at http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/review-reviser/camr_rcam_msf_11-eng.pdf. 
 167 See id.; see also Cohen-Kohler, Esmail & Cosio, supra note 160 (“Administratively, 
the CAMR assumes that developing country governments have the requisite knowledge 
and human resource capacity to make use of the regime.”). 
 168 MCHARG, supra note 166.  
 169 Id. 
 170 See id. 
 171 See CAMR Letter, supra note 163. 
 172 Id.  
 173 Preparing to Submit an Application, CAN.’S ACCESS TO MEDS. REGIME, 
http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/compan-entrepris/applic-demande/prepar_e.html (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2010) (“At least 30 days before submitting the application, the company 
must try to obtain from the patent holder a voluntary licen[s]e to make and export the 
patented product.”). 
 174 Paige E. Goodwin, Note, Right Idea, Wrong Result—Canada’s Access to Medicines 
Regime, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 578 (2008).   
 175 Generic Drugs for Rwanda, supra note 157. 
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support of the distribution of the less expensive version of their 
medicine.176 
The Apotex example highlights the complexities in the process 
for exporting drugs to developing countries and LDCs.  Even in a 
country that has the legislation in place to facilitate the 
export/import process, the generic manufacturer threatened to back 
out and no additional countries have requested aid.  Therefore, 
CAMR should be used as a case study for countries thinking of 
implementing TRIPS provisions within their legislation.  The 
Council for TRIPS should also study this drug product exchange 
and examine whether changes can and should be made to the 
Paragraph 6 system.  This issue will be analyzed further in Part IV. 
B. Fear of Retaliation 
On top of the legislative aspects preventing widespread 
implementation of the Paragraph 6 system, LDCs may be hesitant 
to seek products from an exporting country for fear of trade 
retaliation.177  The same fear is present when a developing or least 
developed country issues a compulsory license or partakes in 
parallel importation.  Trade retaliation occurs when a first country 
such as the United States places sanctions on a second country for 
partaking in a trade-related activity that negatively affects a certain 
market in the first country.178 
For instance, when Thailand issued its compulsory license in 
2007, the United States responded by placing Thailand on the 
Special 301 Report.179  As briefly discussed in Part II, the United 
States’ Special 301 Report was born out of section 301 of the U.S. 
Trade Act of 1974.180  Relating to intellectual property, section 301 
allows the United States to take action in the form of trade 
sanctions against those countries that do not provide adequate 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 Dutfield, supra note 1, at 123. 
 178 Feroz Ali. K, Intellectual Property Rights—US, Trade Sanctions and IPRs, HINDU 
BUS. LINE (June 15, 2004), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/06/15/stories/ 
2004061500111100.htm.   
 179 See Evans, supra note 137, at 184. 
 180 See Lucyk, supra note 123, at 212; Ali. K, supra note 178.   
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intellectual property protection.181  The United States places these 
countries on a watch list, otherwise known as the Special 301 
Report.182 
In yet another example of retaliation, as previously discussed in 
Part II, the Clinton administration put South Africa on the section 
301 watch list after it attempted to pass similar legislation.183  As 
such, the legislation was never implemented in South Africa, even 
though the lawsuit brought by the pharmaceutical companies was 
dropped.184  Because placement on such lists can lead to trade 
sanctions, these countries are always mindful of the effects that 
certain actions can have on foreign direct investments.185  Thus, 
unless TRIPS is amended to include a deterrent mechanism to 
prevent countries from partaking in trade retaliation after a 
compulsory license is issued, this hesitancy may remain. 
C. Interference with Intellectual Property Rights of Patent 
Holders 
While compulsory licenses, parallel importation, and the 
Paragraph 6 System are allowed by TRIPS and do provide for a 
way in which LDCs can obtain products at substantially less than 
retail price,186 they are not methods which should be sustained in 
the long run due to their interference with intellectual property 
rights. 
In the case of a compulsory license without export capabilities, 
the patent owner is forced to license its formula or technology for 
little remuneration at best, especially when dealing with LDCs.187  
When a patent owner is forced to license his formula or technology 
for little pecuniary gain, he is giving up one of the benefits of 
 
 181 See Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006); see also Ali. K, supra note 
178. 
 182 See Ali. K, supra note 178. 
 183 Lucyk, supra note 123, at 213. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Evans, supra note 137, at 184.   
 186 See Dutfield, supra note 1, at 121–22.  
 187 See Lucyk, supra note 123, at 209–10 (describing that royalties under a compulsory 
license tend to be lower than the profits lost by the licensor, particularly where the 
compulsory license is specifically implemented to lower prices). 
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obtaining a patent.188  As stated previously, one of the purposes of 
implementing the patent system is to encourage innovation by 
giving the inventor a monopoly over that specific technology so 
that he can recoup the costs he incurred in developing the 
invention.189 
On the other side of the argument, under TRIPS, this license is 
only given in very limited circumstances—such as a country’s dire 
need for treatment of epidemic diseases.190  Thus, in the markets 
where companies make most of their profits, the patent monopoly 
will still be recognized.  Additionally, the patent owner will not 
have to devote any of its production or capital to the manufacture 
of drugs because it is only licensing the technology in the patent.  
Regardless, this method of promoting public health still goes 
against the purpose of the TRIPS Agreement and erodes the 
benefits of a patent owner’s temporary monopoly.191 
Parallel importation also encroaches on the benefits that a 
patent owner hopes to receive from its patent.  When a country 
obtains a patented product through a channel other than the patent 
owner, it is eroding the monopoly to which the patent owner may 
be entitled.  This can happen when a country with a valid license 
from the patent owner has an intellectual property regime in place 
that allows for parallel importation.192  Although countries differ in 
their treatment of parallel importation, the main purpose of TRIPS 
is to promote increased protection of intellectual property rights.193  
Thus, allowing a country to buy patented products from a party 
other than the patent owner contravenes this purpose. 
 
 188 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 7, at 284.  
 189 See id. at 283–84. 
 190 See Lucyk, supra note 123, at 193. 
 191 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 7, at 283.  
 192 See KEITH E. MASKUS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PARALLEL IMPORTS IN 
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION AND PRICES IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 1, 2 (2001); see also Goodwin, supra note 174, at 572 (noting that such a risk 
is evident in implementation of these provisions, such that the 2003 Decision requires the 
importing country to “take reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their 
administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the 
products that have actually been imported into their territories under the system” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
 193 See Goodwin, supra note 174, at 570. 
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With the Paragraph 6 system, the patent owner also loses 
possible revenue and experiences erosion of its monopoly.194  In 
addition, generic companies must devote production capacities and 
capital. The profits of a generic company are eroded because 
resources are used to manufacture drugs for export through the 
Paragraph 6 System that could be used to generate a profit.  But 
one beneficial effect would be the positive press that the 
companies receive from these public health efforts. 
D. Technology Not Suited for LDCs 
Another categorical reason why the public health provisions in 
TRIPS are not currently suited to provide a long-term solution to 
the problem of lack of access to essential pharmaceuticals is that 
the technology and treatments available through these provisions 
are not necessarily directed towards the needs of those in 
developing and least developed countries.195  A patent provides 
innovation incentive to pharmaceutical companies to produce 
drugs that will give them a healthy return on their investment.196  
Unfortunately, treatment of tropical diseases or forms of diseases 
occurring mostly in LDCs provide little or no innovation for a 
pharmaceutical company to spend resources due to the low return 
on investment they would receive.197  This is because these 
diseases are prevalent in poor countries, yet virtually non-existent 
in the developed countries where citizens can afford to pay the 
retail prices that pharmaceutical companies charge to recoup their 
investment. 
 
 194 See Lucyk, supra note 123, at 200. 
 195 See A Guide to the Post-2005 World: TRIPS, R&D and Access to Medicines, 
MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (Feb. 25, 2005), http://www.msf.org/msfinter 
national/invoke.cfm?objectid=88694E5B-0FED-434A-A21EDA1006002653& 
component=toolkit.article&method=full_html&CFID=14506321&CFTOKEN=5743106
3; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim, Think Globally, Prescribe Locally: How Rational 
Pharmaceutical Policy in the U.S. Can Improve Global Access to Essential Medicines, 34 
AM. J.L. & MED. 125, 125 (2008).   
 196 See A Guide to the Post-2005 World, supra note 195. 
 197 LDCs are not a profitable market due to low buying power that their people and 
governments possess. See id.  Drug companies cannot turn a profit by marketing and 
selling a drug solely in LDCs. See id.; see also Dutfield, supra note 1, at 112–13 
(pointing out that the poor are disproportionately affected by diseases and receive little 
resources compared to people affected by diseases prevalent in a developed country).   
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Thus, while TRIPS may be able to help in situations of national 
emergency or public health crises where a patent for the disease 
actually exists, its public health provisions are not the optimal 
solution for the future.  Long-term feasibility is questionable, at 
best, because TRIPS fails to alleviate the “constant tension 
between patent holder and consumer” and attempts to “mediate [it] 
through a complex body of rules.”198 
E. Purpose of TRIPS Is Not for Promotion of Public Health 
The main purpose of TRIPS is not to help curb the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in LDCs.  Rather, its purpose is to ensure that holders of 
intellectual property rights in one member country receive 
reciprocal protection in another member country.  This is 
accomplished by setting up a framework in which countries can 
implement legislation and negotiate bilateral and multilateral 
treaties.199  It has been asserted that TRIPS owes its existence to 
the United States and developed European countries as a means of 
securing an “advantage in knowledge-based industries.”200  These 
countries knew that they were no longer the manufacturing 
powerhouses that they once were and that their advantage would 
now have to depend on the knowledge that they produced.201  
Thus, they wanted a means by which their intellectual property 
could be protected outside of their own countries and TRIPS was 
their vehicle of choice.   
Public health was not on their agendas and it did not really 
come into focus until after TRIPS had been established—when 
prices for life-saving treatments remained high.202  Because 
developed countries want greater intellectual property protection 
outside of their borders for their inventions and because LDCs 
become subject to higher prices and subsequent lack of access if 
they recognize these higher levels of protection, there is a constant 
conflict between developed countries and LDCs.203 
 
 198 Evans, supra note 137, at 186. 
 199 See TRIPS, supra note 12, at pmbl. 
 200 Lucyk, supra note 123, at 212. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See id. 
 203 See id. at 213.  
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F. Lack of Sustainability 
One of the problems with the Paragraph 6 System and parallel 
importation is the lack of sustainability that results for LDCs such 
as those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The public health measures 
enumerated in the TRIPS Agreement allow countries to import 
pharmaceutical products.204  But by continuously allowing for the 
importation of these life-saving treatments, an LDC may never 
learn how to sustain itself without relying on developed 
countries.205  Additionally, while TRIPS calls for the observance of 
intellectual property rights across all of its member countries,206 it 
does not give guidance on how to develop a fully functional 
intellectual property regime.  LDCs will never be able to fully take 
advantage of the agreement if they are not able to implement the 
proper framework to recognize intellectual property rights.  The 
ultimate goal should be for these countries to have full 
manufacturing and distribution capabilities as well as an 
intellectual property regime capable of protection and enforcement 
of such rights. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS 
A. TRIPS Options—Short Term 
All three of the aforementioned public health measures in 
TRIPS—compulsory licenses, the Paragraph 6 System, and 
parallel importation207—can promote public health by offering 
avenues in which developing and least developed countries could 
obtain otherwise unaffordable treatment for epidemic diseases such 
as HIV/AIDS.  But, due to the limitations outlined in the previous 
sections, TRIPS lacks viability as a long-term public health 
solution and continues to stymie those efforts.  Accordingly, these 
measures should be seen as short-term solutions to the lack of 
access problem that developing countries and LDCs are 
 
 204 See Dutfield, supra note 1, at 122. 
 205 See Evans, supra note 137, at 178.  
 206 Id. at 179–80. 
 207 See supra Part I.A; see also Dutfield, supra note 1, at 121–22. 
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experiencing.  As will be discussed later in Part IV.B, there are 
other options that are more feasible as long-term solutions. 
1. Compulsory Licenses 
Compulsory licenses alone or within the Paragraph 6 System 
can deliver much needed assistance by providing LDCs with the 
essential medicines that they need to treat epidemic diseases such 
as HIV/AIDS in the short term.  If an LDC has manufacturing 
capabilities, access to a compulsory license alone would enable it 
to manufacture drugs for those in need at a much lower cost.208  
Also, the mere option of being able to assert a compulsory license 
can strengthen the bargaining power of a country with 
manufacturing capabilities to obtain a lower price from patent 
holders of pharmaceuticals such as anti-AIDS drugs.209  But in 
addition to the limitations stated in section A, compulsory licenses 
outside the Paragraph 6 System cannot be used by countries 
lacking manufacturing capability.    
2. Paragraph 6 System 
In order to provide essential medicines for those member 
countries without manufacturing capabilities, member countries 
with production capabilities can produce the drugs and export them 
to the requesting importing member country.210  Again, even 
though this Paragraph 6 system has barely been utilized up to this 
point, there is now a model, CAMR,211 which other countries can 
use as an example when revising their own legislation. 
By analyzing Canada’s drug patent legislation and the CAMR 
Rules, member countries to the TRIPS Agreement can find 
provisions in the legislation that are necessary as well as provisions 
that can be changed to ensure more use of the system.  If changes 
can be made to allow for a less complex system in which 
producing parties can go about manufacturing and exporting in a 
less costly and cumbersome way and importing parties are not 
hampered by burdensome procedures for importing drugs, the 
 
 208 Lucyk, supra note 123, at 193. 
 209 Dutfield, supra note 1, at 120.   
 210 See Reichman, supra note 47, at 247–49. 
 211 See Goodwin, supra note 174, at 569.  
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system may find more use.  Some suggestions include removing 
the negotiation requirement prior to applying for a compulsory 
license, removing unnecessary clauses to make it easier for LDCs 
to analyze the legislation, and expanding the number of drugs 
available for export.212  The negotiation requirement is not present 
in TRIPS and would only hinder a generic company’s ability or 
desire to manufacture drugs for export.  However, while this 
system, if implemented properly, can provide the LDCs lacking 
manufacturing capacity with the drugs necessary to treat epidemic 
diseases in the short-term, it should not be a long-term solution. 
3. Parallel Importation 
Member countries can also make use of parallel importation to 
bring in needed drugs that are produced in other countries.  Even 
though this system of parallel importation undermines the 
intellectual property rights of the country that owns the rights to 
the drug,213 it is one method by which a country can obtain 
pharmaceutical products at a price cheaper than purchasing them 
from the patent owner at their retail price.214 
B. Long Term Options 
1. Collaborative Groups 
One model of providing public health assistance to LDCs that 
has had early success is a group known as the International Drug 
Purchase Facility, or UNITAID.215  UNITAID was founded in 
2006 as a funding institution by a group of countries that “aim to 
provide further drug access at affordable prices to developing 
countries on a sustainable and predictable basis.”216  These 
countries utilize long-term funding commitments, such as the 
collection of taxes on airline flights, to purchase drugs or other 
 
 212 See MCHARG, supra note 166. 
 213 See MASKUS, supra note 192, at 2. 
 214 See id. at 121.   
 215 Mission, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/UNITAID-Mission.html (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2010). 
 216 G.A. Res 60/262, supra note 108, ¶ 48. 
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diagnostic tools at a high volume, which allows for a steep 
reduction in cost.217 
With TRIPS, the LDC requesting the drug treatment is not 
fiscally equipped to purchase the drugs and does not receive 
financial help from other parties, except the patent owner and/or 
member country that is providing the technology or drugs.  This 
places a huge burden on the providing party because their only 
form of compensation, if any, is “adequate remuneration.”  Unlike 
the provisions in TRIPS, UNITAID actually purchases the drugs, 
albeit at a reduced cost from the original retail price, using funds 
pooled from numerous countries.218  Thus, the patent owner 
actually receives compensation.  UNITAID, in a sense, has 
managed to alleviate most of the tension between allowing a 
patentee to obtain profits from its patented invention and providing 
affordable access to low-income countries, whereas this tension 
still remains in a compulsory license situation through TRIPS. 
For example, UNITAID will often work in conjunction with 
other organizations like UNICEF and the WHO.219  UNITAID will 
provide the funding (through mechanisms such as the collection of 
airline taxes) and its partner organizations are responsible for 
procuring drugs at reduced prices.220  Just recently, UNITAID 
obtained a 60% reduction in price for pediatric HIV/AIDS 
medicines, which allowed for three times as many infected 
children to be treated as would be treated at 100% of the price.221  
So while 40% of retail price is a deep reduction in price, it is better 
than a compensation percentage of less than 6%, which is typical 
for remuneration in a compulsory license situation.222 
The success of this group is just one indication that countries 
are willing to take action to help alleviate the world’s public health 
 
 217 How Innovative Financing Works, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/How-
innovative-financing-works.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).  
 218 See Questions and Answers, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/images/NewWeb/ 
documents/en_qa_finalrevised_mar10.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). 
 219 Id. 
 220 See id.  
 221 See Statement on World AIDS Day, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/2008 
1201165/News/UNITAID-statement-on-world-AIDS-day.html (last visited Apr. 12, 
2010). 
 222 See LOVE, supra note 41, at 7–9. 
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problems despite the lack of implementation of TRIPS provisions.  
In just a few years of existence, UNITAID has grown to twenty-
nine countries and has already been able to commit $730 million 
towards its goal, and it is currently providing for those in need.223  
In fact, over twenty countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are receiving 
funds.224  Compare this with the one instance where the Paragraph 
6 system was used—and only two countries were involved. 
UNITAID is a means for countries to participate in alleviating 
the world’s public health problems in which the constant tension 
that remains with a compulsory license/export scenario—the 
patentee’s right to obtain profits from its invention versus 
affordable access for low-income countries—is greatly reduced.  
As mentioned above, because the main purpose of TRIPS is to 
foster shared intellectual property rights across country borders, 
and not to provide access to life-saving treatments,225 this tension 
will always exist when the provisions of TRIPS are used. 
2. Private-Public Partnerships 
Like TRIPS, however, UNITAID fails to provide a framework 
through which the country to which it is providing aid can 
eventually sustain itself.  A 2006 U.N. Political Declaration alludes 
to another option that may provide for sustainability and 
furtherance of intellectual property rights in addition to access to 
essential and affordable medicines on a long-term basis.226  In this 
Declaration, the U.N. “[e]ncourage[s] pharmaceutical companies, 
donors, multilateral organizations and other partners to develop 
public-private partnerships in support of research and development 
and technology transfer, and in the comprehensive response to 
HIV/AIDS.”227 
 
 223 Achievements, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/Achievements.html (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2010). 
 224 Countries Benefiting from HIV/AIDS Funding, UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/ 
Countries-benefiting-from-HIV/AIDS-funding.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).  
 225 See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: 
An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 457.  
 226 G.A. Res 60/262, supra note 108, ¶ 45.  
 227 Id. ¶ 46.  
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A public-private partnership can help achieve the ultimate goal 
of full manufacturing and distribution capabilities as well as a fully 
functional intellectual property regime for LDCs.  In this type of 
partnership, private enterprises join forces with public sector 
organizations or international organizations.228  The private party 
or even the international organizations are the parties that shoulder 
most of the financial and technological risk.229  For LDCs, this is 
important because their governments and citizens cannot afford to 
shoulder the burden on their own.  The private enterprise will also 
impart its expertise in areas like product development and 
dissemination.230  An example of this partnership is the Kenya 
Medical Research Institute (“KEMRI”).231  KEMRI is a state 
owned corporation that partners with both local and outside 
organizations such as the Wellcome Trust and the Centers for 
Disease Control (the “CDC”), wherein these organizations impart 
their expertise to KEMRI.232  KEMRI is now instrumental in 
providing pharmaceutical research, development, and local 
innovation in Kenya.233  It is also connected to the hospital systems 
where it assists in the delivery of healthcare.234 
While solutions such as public-private partnerships should be 
preferred over the Paragraph 6 System and parallel importation, 
compulsory licenses may be necessary for quite some time.  This 
necessity is due to the fact that manufacturing capacity and 
technological know-how does not give a country the actual 
technology that might be needed to provide sustained treatment.  
More often than not, this technology will be patent-protected, and 
without the funds to either purchase the drugs outright from the 
patent owner or pay a reasonable fee for a license, a compulsory 
license will be needed.235  But, over time, the hope is that with the 
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 235 Theodore C. Bailey, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in 
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help of partnerships and other methods, these countries will 
generate innovative technology on their own. 
CONCLUSION 
The public health provisions in TRIPS (compulsory licenses, 
the Paragraph 6 System, and parallel importation) have not been 
very successful in alleviating the world’s public health problems.  
Although some countries were able to provide low cost medicines 
to their citizens through compulsory licenses,236 the few countries 
making use of them have been subject to retaliation and 
resistance.237  The Paragraph 6 System, although it provided 
treatment for those in need in Rwanda,238 has only been used once 
and has received much criticism.  In addition, no other country has 
taken advantage of it.  Although countries and organizations 
appear to support the provisions, the support has been limited to 
passive written and verbal support. 
While these provisions may be able to provide short-term and 
emergency options, they are ineffective for long-term solutions to 
public health problems.  Tension will always remain between 
member countries seeking profits through better intellectual 
property protection and countries needing access to patented 
medicines.  Because of this tension, developing and least 
developed countries will remain cautious for fear of retaliation and 
loss of foreign direct investment.239  In addition, requirements for 
implementation of these provisions are somewhat cumbersome and 
complex, making them difficult to implement. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to solve the 
world’s public health problems, ventures such as private-public 
partnerships can avoid the tension resulting from TRIPS and 
provide long-term sustainability by imparting funds, and 
technological, manufacturing, and distribution know-how.  Private-
public partnerships can also help implement an intellectual 
property regime. 
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In essence, because of its focus on equal and rigorous 
protection of intellectual property rights, TRIPS hurts LDCs’ 
access to essential pharmaceuticals despite the various public 
health provisions built into the agreement.  Thus, the TRIPS 
Agreement should not be used as a long-term solution to the public 
health problem of access to essential pharmaceuticals. 
 
